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Kaoko Takahashi
Worldwide, providing su$cient housing has been a main concern of planning, and numerous
endeavors have been made to meet the growing needs in this ﬁeld. In Southeast Asia, a negative
combination of the rapid population growth in metropolises and unsatisfactory housing supply due
to inadequate policy responses has caused the proliferation of substandard settlements. With the aim
of relieving the urban housing crisis, a variety of proactive approaches through di#erent channels
have been proposed. However, past experiences in Southeast Asian countries substantiate that
neither top-down mass public-housing schemes nor bottom-up self-help housing practices
approaches can stand alone. Based on these lessons from history, the housing development para-
digms for the urban poor have undergone a major shift amid the advancement of neo-liberalism since
the 1980s. Within this shift, a new strategy of enablement has been introduced, encouraging the
utilization of markets and the institutionalization of civil society as an o$cial development partner.
One phenomenon, increasingly apparent from the 1990s, is that under this enablement strategy
within the new political economy, dynamic intersectoral collaborations among concerned actors are
being pushed forward, which is expected to lead to the delivery of more democratic planning styles.
It is important to note that, despite the decrease in direct government interventions, governments
still persist as the major player in overall development, attending to the reconstruction of renewed
interdependent relationships between the state and citizen.
1. Introduction
Since the end of World War II, housing development has gained signiﬁcance within
policy arenas in the public domain. This is partly a reﬂection of the shift from warfare
to welfare regimes addressing social and human development. However, it should be
remembered that initial motivations driving postwar development were stemmed from
fundamental aspirations to restore devastated cities. While such tendencies may be
identiﬁed worldwide, the proportion of low-income households clustering in substan-
dard settlements has continued to increase, and remains high in developing countries.
The reasons for this trend are at least two-fold. First, urbanization pressures have
been more intensive in developing countries than in developed countries (Dimitriou,
1990). Particularly in Asia, a sharp rise in foreign investments has led to major
industrial structural changes in many countries. The rapid growth of export-oriented
industrialization has in turn reinforced concentration in primate cities. Owing to
massive internal migrations from peripheries to centers, housing demand in urban areas
has reached a level unprecedented in human history. Second, housing is often regarded
as a social cost instead of a productive investment, and thus housing policies have
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seldom been incorporated into national goals. In fact, few governments in developing
countries were concerned with housing policies despite accumulative growth in me-
tropolises. Such a climate of neglect was exacerbated by the assumption that the
housing sector was unproductive (Choguill, 1995). While it is commonsensical to expect
housing to be supplied in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quality and
quantity in tandem with the changing economic landscape, housing policies in many
developing nations have simply not kept pace.
As a consequence, informal settlements started to emerge as shelters for uncounted
urban inhabitants. Generally speaking, most governments regarded the mushrooming
of informal settlements as a transitionary phenomenon that would gradually fade away
with economic development (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). In reality, however,
slum districts have swelled as economic development pushed the poor out of housing
and land markets. The housing crisis, with its expansion of dilapidated living environ-
ments, is therefore inextricably linked to global economic forces, coupled with the lack
of appropriate government policies to deal with accommodating people under condi-
tions of drastic structural changes. Inasmuch as informal settlements have existed for
years, problems pertaining to the housing of the urban poor trace lines of continuity
with the past; but these have become more striking on the policy agenda amid massive
modernization, urbanization, and industrialization in the postwar period.
This type of development pattern appears explicitly in most Southeast Asian
countries. A distinctive trait in the region is the phenomenal increase of urban
population for the last several decades. As Table 1 displays, the total urban population
in major selected Southeast Asian countries has been on the rise particularly since the
1980s. Notwithstanding spiraling housing needs, most megacities have lost control in
catching up with the inﬂux of migrants, by virtue of inadequate policy responses based
on an ill-conceived development discourse. As a result, the proliferation of informal
settlements, which characterize the urban scenery of Southeast Asian metropolises, has
become a common social issue. For example, in Metro Manila, while any estimates of
the population in informal settlements are unlikely to be perfectly accurate, there is
general agreement on the number of around 4 million in the latter half of the 1990s
(Karaos, 1996; Shatkin, 2004). Of special note is that the urban housing crisis in
Southeast Asia today has been aggravated and further complicated by the increasing
proportion of inhabitants who are impoverished in terms of living conditions and whose
housing statuses are unrecognized in a de jure sense.
Table 1 Urban Population Growth and Growth Rates in Selected Southeast Asian Countries,
19602000
Country
Urban population (in millions)
Average annual urban population
growth rates ()
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 19601970 19701980 19801990 19902000
Indonesia 14.0 20.5 33.5 52.3 77.1 4.9 4.5 3.9 3.2
Malaysia 2.1 2.9 4.7 7.3 10.3 4.8 4.4 3.4 2.7
Philippines 8.5 12.4 18.1 25.8 36.3 3.8 3.6 3.4 2.9
Thailand 3.6 4.8 8.1 12.6 19.3 5.1 4.5 4.2 3.7
Source: Rondinelli (1991, p. 793)
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As the extent of the housing crisis has become more visible, various approaches to
housing through di#erent channels have evolved, leading to a diversiﬁcation of not
only the logics behind the approaches but also the actors involved in the planning
process. As Figure 1 shows, modes of housing provision can be categorized generally
into conventional/formal or unconventional/informal. The conventional/formal mode
indicates the provision through o$cial channels of planning, as with public housing
schemes and private sector developments. On the other hand, the unconventional/
informal mode refers to housing produced outside statutory planning frameworks:
informal settlements, unauthorized subdivision, and low-income rental housing
(Keivani and Werna, 2001a: 2001b). Having said this, however, it cannot be denied that
the diagram is too straightforward to encompass the complexity of real world applica-
tions, and that many derivative sub-categories within each mode need to be elaborated.
More importantly, the dichotomy between the two modes is a false one, as they are not
completely separated and there is no clear-cut line distinguishing actors of each mode.
In order to explicate the dynamics of intersectoral interactions transcending the
customary theoretical divides, this study begins with a review of housing development
paradigms for the urban poor with reference to experiences in Southeast Asia. The
objectives of the analytical review are to scrutinize: (1) the trajectory of approaches to
housing from top-down to bottom-up as a developmental tool, giving emphasis to
both theoretical principles and practical schemes; and (2) the role of di#erent actors
the public, the private, and the non-government sectors in housing development.
This study gives particular weight to a pronounced shift in the development model
against a backdrop of neo-liberalism, as represented by the move to the adoption of a
three-cell democratic model in which civil society exists autonomously between the
public and the private sector. Based on the discussions outlined above, this study
investigates the degree to which such a shift has added impetus to reconstructing the
meaning of government interventions and enlarging the inﬂuence of third parties,
which have come to assume some of the responsibilities abdicated by governments.
2. Transition and Overlap between Top-down and Bottom-up Housing Approaches
For several decades after the World War II, the housing development paradigms in
the third world have observed a cut and thrust between government-driven “top-down”
Figure 1 A Conceptual Model of Housing Provision in Developing Countries
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initiatives to people-based “bottom-up” practices. In Southeast Asia, during the early
industrialization phase of national development between the 1960s and 1970s, top-
down schemes served as the dominant development paradigm. Large-scale public
housing projects were carried out by introducing mass construction in pursuit of
modernist principles proclaiming “equal beneﬁts for the greatest number.” Conse-
quently, capital-intensive public housing projects, which provided cost-e#ective pack-
age units for large populations, were generally recognized as the main direction of
housing development. Modern technologies, imported materials, and uniform designs
were the essential components of those projects. Coupled with demolition and redevel-
opment ventures aimed at quantitative targets, this kind of standardized housing
planning was positively accepted by a number of governmental bodies as a way to
achieve e$cient distribution of resources.
A successful case of top-down initiatives is found in Singapore, where the bottom
line of public housing development is the verticalization of space to fully utilize limited
land. Success here manifests as high-rise, high-density residential complexes. Several
characteristics distinguish Singapore from its counterparts: (1) accelerated economic
growth and controlled in-migration; (2) slow expansion in the economically active
population and sharp income increases; and (3) a large portion of land owned by the
state when housing projects began (for details, see Hardoy and Sattherwaite, 1989). Of
the three, the most salient attribute is the proportion of government-owned land at the
outset of housing development: around 55 of the island’s land was taken up by the
government and its related agencies like the Housing Development Board [HDB], the
Jurong Town Corporation, and the Port of Singapore Authority (Casanova et al., 1979).
An additional characteristic discovered in Singapore is the existence of well-
structured institutional settings aligned to o#er housing options in the wake of slum
clearances. In Singapore, the HDB was created in 1960 before the independence of the
nation from Malaysia in 1965; it was mandated to administer overall housing develop-
ment throughout the island based on ﬁve-year building programs. With the enactment
of the Land Acquisition Act of 1966, the HDB bore the primary responsibility for
acquiring land for public housing projects and initiating associated urban renewals.
Besides, a#ordability facilitated by accessible ﬁnancing supports was the key to this
success. The Singaporean government raised the percentage of public homeownership
through fostering purchase rather than rental. Strikingly high rates of public home-
ownership attest to the availability of ﬁnancial assistance. For example, the HDB public
ﬁnance sector was set up to enable potential homebuyers to utilize subsidized mortgage
rates; homebuyers are also allowed to use the Central Provident Fund [CPF]2 to buy a
unit. In sum, the Singapore case indicates three factors for such great achievement.
First, these kinds of spectacular housing projects must break ground at an initial phase
of development. Substantive success for public housing developments depends in part
upon early implementation before cities begin sprawling in a rampant, disordered
manner. Second, the systematic arrangement of institutional and administrative set-
tings must be established with strong political resolve and stringent regulations. Third,
the availability of ﬁnancing services to render the poor eligible to apply for must be
ensured.
In most of the other developing countries, however, government-led housing at-
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tempts revealed many shortcomings in attaining both qualitative and quantitative
targets. Massive public housing schemes in these countries have been subjected to two
main criticisms. The ﬁrst criticism points to failure to accommodate people in need
because neither purchase nor rental of public housing units was within the budgetary
range of low-income households. As a result, “the intended beneﬁciaries, the urban slum
dwellers, were not beneﬁting” (Mukhija, 2001, p. 214). The second criticism relates to
the issue of need gaps between providers and receivers, deriving primarily from the
importing of inadequate housing development models from the West. Because many
professionals and experts of housing planning were educated in Europe and the U.S.,
their values are based not on indigenous values but on predominant wisdoms formed by
social trends in the West (Payne, 1977; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989; Gilbert and
Gugler, 1992; Okpala, 1999). “The hold of modernity as an image for the elites and
developers of postwar cities was such that considerations of local identity or regional-
ism were swept aside” (Askew and Logan, 1994, p. 7). Additionally, the adoption of high
architectural standards and materials imported from the West raises questions of
management and maintenance abilities. In many instances, architectural design and
technology as well as size and location of units were unsuitable from the poor’s
perspective (Keivani and Werna, 2001a). On top of this, the limited ﬁnancial and
administrative capacities of governments constitute a major negative factor. Consider-
ing the fact that the proportion of housing built by the public sector remains negligible,3
demolition of informal settlements exacerbates the urban housing crisis and brings
about a sharp decline in the housing stock for low-income households, causing over-
crowding in other substandard settlements (Rondinelli, 1990). Given the array of
constraints like ﬁnance, land availability, and institutional and administrative settings,
capital-intensive public housing planning may not be a workable solution in most
developing countries. In e#ect, inadequate and insu$cient housing provision by
governments leads to public neglect of the centrally controlled projects.
In many Southeast Asian countries, public housing projects have ended in collapse
on one level or another. To cite a case, the Malaysian government launched low-cost
housing programs under the new economic plans from the early 1970s with the aim of
meeting the housing needs of families whose monthly income was less than 750 ringgit.
Granted that the slogans were upheld, the number of units completed was far below the
number originally planned, while special low-cost projects were given a lower priority
compared to other development activities.4 Thailand’s path also followed the same
trajectory as Malaysia. Along with slum clearances and urban renewals, pushing ahead
with public housing became a principal instruction. In 1972, the National Housing
Authority [NHA] of Thailand was founded under the World Bank’s guidance, embark-
ing on low-cost housing projects largely on the urban fringe of Bangkok. Nevertheless,
the NHA’s supply similarly did not satisfy actual demand.5 As with other countries,
problems with quantity, location, and a#ordability were three major drawbacks. In
1989, only 2.7 of the units for sale in Bangkok were less than the price level of
“low-cost units” under 200,000 baht (Crane, Daniere and Harwood, 1997); units for
low-income households built between 1974 and 1984 were located on the urban fringe,
more than 20 kilometers from the center (Dowall, 1992); households had to earn 6,500
baht monthly to purchase these low-cost units (Foo, 1992), yet the average income of
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slum dwellers was 3,700 baht and that of informal settlers was 2,000 baht or less
(Bhakdi, 1987). In the end, the occupancy rate of the units on the outskirts was just 43
(Dowall, 1992). These ﬁgures prove that the main obstacles in prompting low-cost
housing development are di$culties in ensuring the smooth ﬂow of budgets for the
development, acquiring land in the city center, and preparing loan credit supports.
The Philippines is no exception. Together with other resettlement measures,
Bagong Lipunan (New Society) Integrated Sites and Services [BLISS] projects the
construction of multi-storey, medium-density residential complexes were executed
under the Ministry of Human Settlements founded in 1978. These were originally
intended to contain urban poor households; but they did not generate any substantial
impact in mitigating the housing crisis in Metro Manila, by reason of deﬁcient a#ordabi-
lity and quantity. Only the privileged, the upper 10 of Metro Manila’s population,
could a#ord to enjoy the beneﬁt of BLISS. In addition, the number of the households
displaced for BLISS projects were much larger than the total output of the projects,
which was less than 2,500 units (Berner, 1997).
In the search for an alternative approach, housing policies from the 1970s started to
involve non-conventional “bottom-up” modes requiring less government interventions
and promoting residents’ actions. A series of liberal movements in the 1960s and 1970s
gave rise to greater demand for personal and popular control over key political and
social dimensions. These movements saw a change of perceptions towards the poor’s
capacity in housing development and cultivated the concept of self-help. The self-help
housing approach, which originated with scholars like Charles Abrams, William
Mangin, and John F. C. Turner, is predicated upon the leverage of residents’ labor to
ameliorate their own living environments. One of the biggest myths challenged is Oscar
Lewis’s idea of a “culture of poverty”: that the poor are poor by nature and poverty is
their own fault (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992). Advocates of self-help claim that informal
settlements should be perceived not as eyesores but as panaceas to the urban housing
crisis: “such settlements were not only well adapted to the needs and circumstances of
their residents, but were also typically improved over time” (Harris, 2003, p.257).
Incremental improvement procedures, which Turner (1976) terms progressive develop-
ment, would naturally occur through residents’ voluntary endeavors. Hence, the
self-help approach views people as having the potential to ﬁx up housing for them-
selves.
Four observations can be made in the context of the increasing importance of the
self-help housing approach in planning debates. First, the approach is more suitable for
housing conditions in developing countries where units established through individual
e#orts account for more than half of the total housing stocks. Second, providing land
and basic infrastructure and letting residents build is less costly than providing ﬁnished
products of public housing. Third, the approach holds the promise of enhancing
community development. Fourth, it can contribute to the creation of property rights
and assets (Pugh, 1997). Because of these observations, the ideas of self-help was
embraced with enthusiasm by international agencies and governments, and soon gained
currency within contemporary policy agendas in the third world. Accordingly, bottom-
up self-help practices have thrived since the 1970s.
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3. Limits of Bottom-up Development Approach
It has become more controversial to unreservedly welcome the advent of the
self-help housing approach. There are certain limits to what such bottom-up develop-
ment devices can handle. Of all these complications, land issues must be prioritized ﬁrst.
Simply put, housing development for the underprivileged comes down to political
struggles over land, and the self-help approach is not a solution to adjust for land
markets that largely cater to better-o# people (Hall, 1987; Hardoy and Satterthwaite,
1989). Housing development must include the following four physical components to
be ﬁnalized: acquiring land, securing tenure, facilitating infrastructure and public
services, and constructing dwelling units. Among these, the main di$culty lies in not
the building of dwelling units, but rather the provision of access to land (McAuslan,
1985; Hall, 1987). Bearing in mind that informal settlers possess the capacity to
undertake incremental development for upgrading their livelihood spaces, top priority
should be placed on the establishment of land delivery and management mechanisms to
provide access to land.
Past experiences in Southeast Asian countries also demonstrate the dilemma of
retaining land for the living sphere of the needy. In reality, the success of Singapore
derives from its strong governmental ability to acquire land for public purposes; yet in
many Southeast Asian countries, governments are hindered by numerous stumbling
blocks in land acquisition.6 Since the process of land acquisition is an extravagant one
and governments tend to opt for low-value sites on the periphery which are easier to
obtain (Main and Williams, 1994), the locational preference of the urban poor to stay in
the center close to worksites is unlikely to be respected. This is partly because major
Southeast Asian cities have been su#ering from soaring urban land prices for the last
couple of decades. Under a market economy, land becomes a commodity for investment:
investment activities leave large tracts of land in the center unoccupied or undeveloped,
comparable with landowners intentionally doing so for speculative reasons (Dwyer,
1974; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). An example of such major speculation can be
observed in Bangkok. During the scant ﬁve years from 1985, urban land prices went up
1,500 (Douglass and Zoghlin, 1994). Despite smaller appreciation rates compared to
Bangkok, Jakarta also has faced the same predicament.7 Consequences brought about
by distortion of land delivery and management are as follows: (1) a series of forcible
evictions, threatening the existence of informal settlements; and (2) low-income house-
holds having no choice but to take the worst-quality, worst-serviced, and often worst-
located pieces of leftover land in order to minimize the risk of eviction (Main and
Williams, 1994; Hall and Pfei#er, 2000). Unlike other urban areas in Latin America and
Africa where land invasion and illegal occupation might be more tolerated, informal
settlers in Southeast Asian cities are subject to a greater probability of eviction because
of the upsurge in land prices provoked by fast-paced economic growth and associated
urbanization. Under the circumstances, the importance of securing land with tenure is
further reinforced. As Choguill (1999, p. 299) articulates, “a prerequisite for any progres-
sive improvement to take place, in either housing or infra, is security of land tenure.”
It is crucial to mention that security of tenure must coincide with provision of
access to land. Legalizing tenure through titling methods alone does not untangle any
urban land complexity. Proponents of legalization argue for the multiplier economic
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e#ects to housing improvement:8 “where people consider that governments are willing
to take measures to increase security rather than impose formal or legalistic approaches,
they are invariably willing to invest in improving their homes and local neighborhoods”
(Payne, 2004, p.174). On the contrary, opponents are skeptical about the e#ectiveness of
legalization by itself, based on the understanding that governments prefer it because it
is an inexpensive method (Gilbert, 2002). Furthermore, in contradiction to de Soto’s
(1989) assertion, legal tenure itself is not a catalyst for augmenting investments to
eventually increase the value of the poor’s assets unless accessible loan credit supports
are available (Mukhija, 2001). If land delivery and management mechanisms are not
reformed to correct haphazard land-use/development patterns, it will end up as a
zero-sum game. Poor households from the rural hinterland will continue to rely on
informal settlements that often lack security, safety, and comfort.
In addition to the land issues, the self-help housing approach encounters the
problem of exclusivity. Slum upgrading gives as an illustrative example: it aims at in
situ betterment to legalize tenure and expedite construction of basic infrastructure. In
general, informal settlers favor on-site programs, because these preserve not only
existing economic and social systems but also make housing stocks available to low-
income households (Choguill, 1995). In spite of such advantages, real world applications
did not sustain the goals envisaged. Beneﬁts brought by the on-site programs slipped
through the hands of the poor, falling instead into the hands of landowners who were
able to proﬁt owing to the rapid hike in house and land value after neighborhood were
refurbished with infrastructure (Keivani and Werna, 2001a). Consequently, the ﬁnan-
cially disadvantaged poor were doomed to be squeezed out from upgraded sites.
Moreover, the problem also involves cost issues. Actualizing a self-help housing
program inevitably entails the commitment that participants devote plenty of their own
time and labor. The increasing costs for engaging in a program often result in low cost
recovery and the elimination of the poorest households from the program (Rondinelli,
1990). Although the self-help housing approach relies idealistically on a bottom-up
style of development in favor of participatory democracy, it is adversely founded upon
a structure of elimination.
The story of the Kampung Improvement Program [KIP] in Indonesia discloses all
these conﬂicts. The KIP was conceived as an enlightened program in terms of upgrad-
ing both the physical built-environment and social services with relatively inexpensive
costs. In fact, 3.3 million residents enjoyed the beneﬁts brought by the KIP (Werlin,
1999). The government provided roads, lanes, drainage, solid waste management,
communal water and toilet facilities, and health and education centers while leaving the
practical business of building to individual households (UNESCAP, 1993). Nonetheless,
complications did arise from the weak ability and low commitment of residents to ﬁx
and maintain the services and facilities furnished (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). As
a result, the quality of settlements continued to deteriorate. Furthermore, the KIP also
had the adverse e#ect of expelling the poor from improved sites on account of higher
land prices and rents (Karamoy and Dias, 1986). Therefore, regardless of its consider-
able achievements, the KIP could be labeled just as another form of gentriﬁcation, and
it gradually came to receive more negative evaluation.
As the several cases described above portlay, experiences in the ﬁeld substantiate
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that the self-help housing approach cannot stand alone. Governments must recognize
the necessity of creating adequate institutional and regulatory arrangements to assist
resident-based activities. This is because e#ective self-help housing policies should be
accompanied by su$cient political wherewithal to persuade governments, experts,
landowners, construction and building materials ﬁrms, politicians, and administrators
(van der Linden, 1986). Although the marginalized have the potential and willingness,
the economic and political structures of society often prevent them from moving into
action. As Hall (1987) states, putting the philosophy of self-help housing into practice
necessitates considerable e#ects at administrative levels. Whether or not self-help
housing attempts become fruitful depends on the capacity of the public sector to
remove obstacles to people-driven development. In this sense, the self-help housing
approach is not merely bottom-up, supposedly counting on residents’ spontaneous
e#orts; rather, it can be realized within concrete top-down frameworks by inserting
voluntary endeavors into existing formal planning agendas.
4. Emergence of Intersectoral Collaboration amid Prevailing Neo-liberalism
The 1980s can be marked as a momentous turning point in the history of develop-
ment planning. Especially the advancement of neo-liberalism should be identiﬁed in
this context. Development policies a#ected by the perspective of neo-liberalism have
served to justify the withdrawal of central government interventions and support the
augmentation of dependency on the private sector. Apart from the utilization of
markets, such neo-liberal thoughts started to resonate with the democratization move-
ment in the third world, contributing to the legitimization of civil society, notably
NGOs, as an o$cial development partner. Given the pervasive extent of neo-liberalism,
the integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches commenced in earnest from the
1980s onwards.
This policy trend was soon reﬂected in the formation of a new housing approach
named “enablement.” In brief, enablement is a strategy in which the state prescribes
legislative support to mobilize all relevant resources of the private sector, NGOs,
community-based organizations, and households. Enablement might be translated as a
change in the nature of government interventions from direct to indirect involvement,
leaving actual housing provision to non-public sectors such as markets and NGOs.
Responsibilities that governments would take are the formulation of policies and
engagement in institutional reforms for more equitable service provision. Owing to the
strong backing of inﬂuential international agencies, including the United Nations
Centre of Human Settlements [UNCHS] and the World Bank, the enablement strategy
has di#used throughout developing countries and has steadily gained popularity.9 As
the World Bank has proposed, this new strategy sets its sights on achieving institutional
reform by incorporating housing policy into a wider, holistic urban economic and social
development agenda (Pugh, 1997: 2000).
In real world application, this paradigm shift to embrace the private sector and civil
society was exempliﬁed in the development discourse and practices of Southeast Asian
countries. Several noticeable changes in program orientations can be pointed out here.
In Malaysia, during the years of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (19861990), the focus in
housing development moved from the previous emphasis on medium- and high-cost
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unit building to the advocacy of low-cost housing construction by inducing the private
sector’s participation under the Special Housing Program. In fact, the percentage of
built units out of those scheduled reached 69 during the Plan (Yahaya, 1989).
Likewise, the Thai government has imported the concept of enablement into its guiding
principles of housing planning since the Sixth National Economic and Social Develop-
ment Plan (19871991), with a particular highlight on the following two aspects: (1)
encouraging the private sector’s contribution to housing development for the poor;10
and (2) assisting the public and private ﬁnance sector to facilitate low-interest loans for
both housing buyers and developers (Kuraesin, 1998). In this enabling milieu, the Urban
Community Development O$ce [UCDO] was created under the NHA of Thailand in
199211 to help communities forge broader collaborative networks with external entities.
The UCDO presents a variety of credit services not only to ameliorate the living
environment but also to boost entrepreneurship (e.g. activation of small-scale communi-
ty-based business) to stabilize the poor’s income-generation activities. According to
1996 data, 76.92 million baht in housing project loans and 27.01 million baht in
non-project housing loans were approved and allocated to 17,629 households by the
UCDO (Thavinpipatkul, 1997).
The Philippines also pursued enablement policies since the inauguration of the
Aquino administration in 1986. A decisive progress was symbolized by the enactment
of the Urban Development and Housing Act [UDHA] in 1992. The underlying objective
of the UDHA is to fulﬁll sustainable urban development through the preparation of
more rational, equitable land-use and housing planning. In conjunction with the
strengthening of civil society engagement, the UDHA also tries to prompt the private
sector’s involvement in the construction of socialized housing for the poor. One of the
UDHA crucial visions is the achievement of balanced housing: it instructs private
developers to allocate at least 20 of the total project cost or area to socialized housing
.12 A permit for development is not given unless developers obtain proof of compliance
with this requirement. Albeit a low compliance rate in 1993, this gradually improved in
the following year. In 1994 alone, 55 socialized housing projects were erected, produc-
ing 10,849 units in total (Karaos, 1996). Due to the spread of enablement, employment
of private sector resources to bolster housing for low-income households, which had
been inactive for a long time, eventually started to materialize.
With the dissemination of enabling conceptions, a renewed prominence has been
given to the role of third parties. A signiﬁcant change brought by the inception of
enablement is the institutionalization of non-governmental development partners as
typiﬁed by NGOs. Even though the advent of the self-help housing approach in the
1970s was conceivably regarded as the ascendancy of bottom-up participatory develop-
ment models, the approach was not intended to enhance the spirit of citizen empower-
ment. A critical shift during the following ten to twenty years was the legitimization of
NGO activities as an e#ective stimulus to accelerate empowerment. In many Southeast
Asian countries, a chain of decentralized legislation has come into force to dismantle
authoritarian, centralized governing structures, bringing grass-roots organizations into
the mainstream of decision-making systems, thereby creating democratic planning
processes. In the Philippines, for example, an innovative decentralization act, which is
the Local Government Code of 1991, has stipulated that at least 40 of members
Kaoko Takahashi
 76 
constituting local development councils shall be representatives of NGOs advocating on
behalf of the underprivileged. This is to bridge the gaps between idea and practice in
development activities by absorbing citizen voices.
Nevertheless, a backlash against enablement has been triggered by some scholars
who have condemned the market enabling strategy as irrelevant to the context of most
developing countries, in that it underestimates the scale of informal private markets. In
particular, Ward and Jones (1997, p. 172) have taken the stance of criticizing the World
Bank’s new policy of enablement as “becoming increasingly dominated by a monetarist
liberal philosophy, which aimed to reduce subsidies and the direct production of
housing to a minimum.” An important point highlighted here is whether the term
“markets” encompasses informal mechanisms. It should be noted that “the urbanization
pattern in Asia is marked by a paradoxical trend: growth of mega-size cities with a
simultaneous presence of the huge informal sector” (Amin, 2000, p. 49). To be more
precise, informal sector jobs account for 37 of the total employment in developing
countries (UNCHS, 2001). It is quite essential to acknowledge that cities in developing
countries are growing due to the mounting functions of informal mechanisms while
formal mechanisms have limited penetration.
There are also other interpretations of enablement. Some have argued that, while
the World Bank’s housing policies by the early 1980s did intrinsically demonstrate some
characteristics of market-oriented neo-liberalism, the new strategy arising after 1986
contain a far-reaching, comprehensive notion of enablement accompanied by the intent
to reconﬁgure public-private roles in the most e$cient way (Keivani and Werna, 2001b).
Pugh (1997, p. 157) claims that, “the concept of an ‘enablement’ shelter strategy does not
mean any diminution of government responsibility for the housing production and
distribution process,” and instead “enablement was being regarded as facilitative, with
connection to the generalities of state-market-nongovernmental organization-
household relationship” (p. 97). The emphasis is on the potential of the enablement
strategy to organize a new collaborative interrelation transcending traditional catego-
ries such as formal/informal or conventional/unconventional. In this light, Keivani and
Werna (2001a) stress the capability of non-market sectors and pay great attention to the
signiﬁcance of e#ective government interventions to correct market failures. The word
“pluralism” in their view implies no conﬂict between formal and informal, but rather a
coexistence of private markets and non-market sectors including the public sector and
civil society.
The history of housing development in the third world demonstrates that market
solutions have not worked well to alleviate the urban housing crisis. Despite the
potential contribution to widening the range of housing options, provisions for the
underprivileged through formal market mechanisms could represent the least e#ective
way, considering that the major concern of the market economy is proﬁtability. Proﬁts
from housing development for low-income households are usually not attractive
enough for the private sector (Yeh and Laquian, 1979: Okpala, 1999). Some optimists
might expect trickle-down e#ects of housing from high or middle-income people to
low-income people, but there is no evidence that the e#ects have taken place (Hamdi,
1990). Under the market economy principle, income disparities a#ect housing inequali-
ties and consequently the poor are systematically excluded from formal housing mar-
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kets. In order to lessen such unequal distribution through formal markets and reduce
redundancy and fragmentation in development practices, the need for cultivating
partnerships among concerned actors and consolidating various provision modes has
been increasingly emphasized.
As explicitly expressed in the UNCHS Habitat discourse, the planning paradigms of
housing development have undergone a major shift in tandem with current trends.
While the principal concerns at the Vancouver declaration in 1976 converged on
physical planning solutions initiated by government agencies, the main thrust at
Habitat II in 1996 focused on the democratization of the planning process by stressing
(1) public-private partnerships and (2) local governments’ and NGOs’ roles in carrying
out pragmatic steps (Leaf and Pamuk, 1997, p. 74). This paradigm shift certainly
mirrors the di#usion of neo-liberal imperatives postulating the superiority of a less-
interventionist approach based on enablement. Notwithstanding widespread accep-
tance, Pugh (1994, p. 363, quoting Dunn) cautions against romanticizing the enablement
strategy: “it is overoptimistic in its ideal that democratization has the power to solve all
signiﬁcant social problems and that mutual beneﬁts ﬂow universally from market-led
development.” Most important to address, a critical component in the shift is the
reconﬁguration of the public sector’s roles within the overarching structure. Creating
synergies with the state remain essential in improving a favorable enabling environ-
ment: “like it or not, the state continues to be a major player. It may need to be made
more accountable to poor people and more responsive to their claims. But without the
state’s cooperation, the lot of the poor cannot be signiﬁcantly improved. Local empow-
ering action requires a strong state” (Friedmann, 1992, p. 7).
To sum up, governments still persist as the major player even given the current
popularity of the enablement strategy. The purpose of government interventions is not
merely to distribute resources and assets, but to accomplish more equitable distribution
or redistribution in order to correct market failures as well as ensure social equity. Such
a governmental stance does not resemble the conventional top-down approach forcing
people to accept intervention without choices. Rather, as Douglass, Ard-Am and Kim
(1999) state, it is a supportive attitude to reconstruct renewed interdependent relation-
ships between the state and citizen.
5. Conclusion
In order to ease the magnitude of the urban housing crisis, a variety of compassion-
ate approaches through di#erent channels have been proposed. Based on the failure of
government-driven housing projects, an alternative self-help housing approach was
subsequently devised. Nonetheless, it soon became clear that a number of projects
carried out under the self-help philosophy were not functional enough to cope with the
housing crisis in Southeast Asian metropolises. In the aftermath, neo-liberal thought
appearing from the 1980s has shaped a successor strategy of enablement, which was
promoted by the World Bank and the UNCHS. Pugh (1997, p. 164) analyzes this
turnaround with reference to the rise of the renewed political economy: “by the late
1980s the new political economy was evolving towards a new position: this argued for
blended state-market roles, rather than them being viewed as polarized opposites, and
for a deeper understanding of relationships between economics and politics.” One
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phenomenon increasingly apparent from the 1990s is that under the enablement
strategy within the new political economy, the modes and actors of housing provision
have diversiﬁed and transcended traditional classiﬁcations dividing them into conven-
tional/formal and unconventional/informal. Dynamic interactions between these di-
chotomous categories have been politically pushed forward, and this is expected to lead
to the actualization of more democratic planning styles.
The defense of a living sphere for the urban poor will continue to occupy a key
position within contemporary development planning. Given the intensiﬁcation of
urbanization rates in the less developed world, the urban housing crisis is not a
temporary but an ongoing problem. In the context of Southeast Asia, one particular
characteristic of urbanization is the unparalleled growth of capital metropolises. As
Table 2 shows, the present level of human agglomeration in Southeast Asian metropo-
lises is becoming extremely high and this is not likely to be reversed. The United
Nations (2004) estimate projects that over 60 of the total Southeast Asian population
will live in urban areas by 2030. An important remark in this regard is that the noun
attached to primate is no longer “cities”; “regions” have emerged as the unit of these
nodes, due to the rapid geographical expansion of megacities. This suggests that there
is an urgent call for reconsidering the signiﬁcance of housing planning on a regional
scale in this continued urbanizing and globalizing era.
Such a proposition inevitably guides us to revisit the mechanism of urban govern-
ance, positing a question on how expanding metropolitan regions can be managed to
oversee cross-boundary housing issues and what kind of institutional structures are
needed for this management. In this context, while the enabling perception serves to
endorse the rationales of decentralized governance for democratization, the possibility
of centralized governance would be once again discussed in planning debates to deal
with “regional” problems involving di#erent autonomous actors.
Footnotes:
1. The diagram is originally from Drakakis-Smith, Housing and the Urban Development Process, published
in 1981.
2. “The CPF is the Singaporean’s social security system, providing pension and medical care as well as
other schemes. It is mandatory for the employee and his employer to contribute monthly a certain
fraction of the employee’s monthly salary to the fund” (Neo, Lee and Ong, 2003, pp. 26467).
3. Statistics shows that public sector involvement in housing production in Singapore was 79 compared
to 29.5 in Manila; 10.5 in Bangkok; and 1.8 in Jakarta in the early 1990s (Angel and Mayo, 1995).
4. Percentages allocated to housing development out of the state’s total budget allocated were 2.4 in the
Second Malaysia Plan (19711975), 6.1 in the Third Malaysia Plan (19751980), and 3.7 in the
Table 2 Urban Agglomeration in Major Southeast Asian Metropolitan Regions, 2003
Agglomeration Population (in thousands) As  of urban population
Jakarta 12,296 12.3
Kuala Lumpur 1,352 8.7
Metro Manila 10,352 21.2
Singapore 4,253 100.0
Bangkok 6,486 32.4
Source: World Urbanization Prospect, 2003 Revision (United Nation, 2004)
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Fourth Malaysia Plan (19811985). The numbers of units constructed respectively were 13,244, 26,250,
71,310, representing around 40 of the numbers planned (Yahaya, 1989).
5. The number of dwelling units built by the NHA of Thailand between 1976 and 1978 was 37,031
(Bhakdi, 1987); however it gradually slowed down. One survey conducted between 1984 and 1988
shows that the number of dwelling units built by private developers on the urban fringe was 116,672;
conversely, the number of public housing units served by the NHA of Thailand was estimated around
10,000 (Dowall, 1992).
6. A number of constraints hampering the e#ective use of land can be identiﬁed in legislative and policy
domains. For example, in Malaysia, the federal law stipulates that the subjects of land and housing are
in complete control of the state governments and local councils, so that the federal government has no
authority to interfere with the subjects (Casanova et al., 1979; Yahaya, 1989). Thus, absolute fragmen-
tation by law makes it impossible to picture the holistic goals of housing development at the national
level.
7. “The estimated land values for a parcel of land increased approximately 11 per year between 1987
and 1989 for parcels located about 10 km away from the Central Business District [CBD]. Land prices
for land in the center of the city increased less than 5 a year (in real terms) while land approximately
20 km away from the CBD increased by 18.3 a year on average during the same period” (Crane,
Daniere and Harwood, 1997, p. 1498).
8. According to de Soto (1989), legal titles would enable the poor to access formal credit services and
accumulate capital, which could lead to the activation of land and property markets.
9. Based on these enablement principles, the UNCHS later developed the Global Strategy for Shelter to the
Year 2000, which was accepted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. The World Bank also
introduced a seven-point program in 1993, which advocates the idea of whole housing sector develop-
ment. The program includes several points to be conceptualized: the development of housing ﬁnance
systems, property rights, and infrastructure; the targeting of subsidies; the introduction of regulatory
audits; improved organization and competition in the building industry; and appropriate institutionary-
loaded reform (Pugh, 2001).
10. In e#ect, the housing stock contributed by developers accounted for 36 in 1988; in 1993, the
percentage rose to 50 (Yap, 1996).
11. The UCDO deﬁnes itself as a banker and facilitator, as well as coordinator to advance vocational skills,
raise income, and secure housing for the urban poor (UCDO, n.a.). Thus, the UCDO’s focus is not on
constructing dwelling units; rather, it aims at socio-economic development through improving living
spheres. The UCDO was renamed the Community Organization Development Institute, known as CODI,
in 2000 as part of reorganization with the Rural Development Fund.
12. In compliance with the law, private developers’ contributions may be made under any of the schemes
below: development of a new settlement, slum upgrading or renewal, joint venture projects with local
government units [LGU] or any government institution, and participation in community mortgage
programs as ﬁnancer or developer, or purchase of LGU housing bonds (ADB, 2001).
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